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ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW:
THE NLRB'S DIVISION OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, 1935-1940*
James A. Gross-
The last, and seldom noted, sentence of section 4(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act reads: "Nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose
of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis."' By 1947, when
the Act was passed, this provision was simply a quiet 2 confirmation of
a congressional decision, seven years earlier, not to appropriate salaries
for the NLRB's Division of Economic Research.3 The reaction to the
Division's work during the NLRB's first five years, however, was hardly
quiet.
The Supreme Court's use in 1937 of the economic and other
non-legal data that the NLRB included in its arguments in Jones and
Laughlin and the other Wagner Act cases4 convinced many experts that
* This study was conducted with the support of a grant from the American Philo-
sophical Society.
t Associate Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. B.S. 1956,
LaSalle College; MA. 1957, Temple University; Ph.D. 1962, University of Wisconsin.
The author wishes to thank the NLRB for permission to examine the records of the
Board's Division of Economic Research, and Judge J. Warren Madden, the first Chairman
of the NLRB, and Judge Charles Fahy, the Board's first General Counsel, for their co-
operation in the oral history phase of the author's current research project: a history of
the NLRB, 1933-1941. Special thanks goes to Miss Judith Byne, an excellent oral history
interviewer, and Mr. Buford Rowland, Mr. George Perros, and Mr. Joseph Howerton of
the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
1 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
2 The scant legislative history generated by this provision apbears in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 495 (1948); id. at 2
NLRB 1052, 1577.
3 Act of Oct. 9, 1940, ch. 780, 54 Stat. 1037.
4 Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937); As-
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the need for economic analysis in labor cases was an accepted fact,
making the NLRB's Division of Economic Research an indispensable
element in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act:
These services, especially that of economic research, are a
powerful complement to the Board's legal work. No small amount
of the success that the NLRB has had before the courts may be at-
tributed to facts that it has been able to present on the respective
industries.... Public policy cannot be determined or enforced in a
vacuum, or by legal precedents alone. Adjudication as well as legis-
lation must be based on the facts of economic and social conditions.
Only in this way can the law be vital. For the purpose of finding
these facts a bureau of economic research is invaluable.5
In opposition to this view, a congressional committee and others
saw the Division as a forum for the allegedly radical leanings of its
Chief Economist, David J. Saposs, and as "perhaps more than any other
[division] in the Board, imbued with that strangely exaggerated sense
of social responsibility that Saposs brought to his work from his back-
ground of socialism and active participation in leftist organizations
and programs."6 Moreover, the committee charged that when these
economic data were admitted into evidence through expert testimony
at NLRB hearings, the Board committed an even more serious breach
of the theory of separation of powers than the courts had recognized:
It will thus be seen that the United States circuit court of ap-
peals in the Inland Steel case, when it condemned the Board, as
"prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner," neglected to mention
that the Board through Saposs and his assistants also acts as its own
"witness" in producing evidence upon which it bases its findings,
which are conclusive and not subject to judicial review.7
This conflict over the Division of Economic Research mirrored
the most controversial and historically important issues in the early
years of the NLRB: questions concerning due process and the proper
administration of justice, the influence of leftist ideologies on the work
of the Board, the preparation of constitutional cases, and the meaning
of the Wagner Act itself-whether Congress intended the NLRB to
be a judicial agency or an "industrial relations" agency. An analysis
of the work of the Division of Economic Research thus provides a use-
sociated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5 Pate, The National Labor Relations Board, 6 So. ECON. J. 56, 57-58 (1939). See also
Ziskind, The Use of Economic Data in Labor Cases, 6 U. Cm. L. Rav. 607 (1939).
6 H.R. Ry'. No. 3109, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 147-48 (1941).
7 H.R. Ras'. No. 1902, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 33-34 (1940).
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ful contribution to our limited understanding of the NLRB as a
functioning institution-as the administrative agency that implements
our national labor policy in an environment of group power and con-
flict.8 Finally, a consideration of the nature of the problems now before
the NLRB, coupled with a review of the reasons for the abolition of
the Division of Economic Research, strongly suggests a reassessment
of the public policy forbidding the NLRB from engaging in economic
analysis.
I
THE WORK OF THE DIVISION OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
Since the prospects for the constitutionality of the Wagner Act
were only as good as the connection between strikes and interferences
with interstate commerce, the NLRB, as early as August 1935, began
to consider "definite plans" for the organization of "industrial eco-
nomic research." 9 Four days after the appointment of J. Warren Mad-
den as the first Chairman of the Wagner Act NLRB, Edwin S. Smith,
a non-lawyer member of the Board, told him that the Board needed
an "industrial economist" thoroughly versed in the history of labor
relations in various industries in this country. He should be a man
capable of presenting his material adequately both in writing and
as a witness. It would certainly be a full-time job, and a busy
one .... 10
Harry A. Millis, a member of the pre-Wagner, Resolution 44 Board,
and Francis Biddle, successor to Lloyd Garrison as that Board's Chair-
man, recommended David J. Saposs for the job."' It is clear from Mr.
Saposs's recollections of his first interview with Chairman Madden that
the Board had neither formulated any "definite plans" for economic
research nor even decided that it could be useful.12
8 Although the literature of administrative law contains much about the legal powers
of agencies, their procedures, and judicial review of their decisions, little is known about
the part-judicial, part-political, part-ideological, part-"expertise" decision-making process
of these agencies.
9 NLRB files, Memorandum from Edwin S. Smith to John Carmody, Work of the
Industrial Economists, Sept. 20, 1935.
10 NLRB files, Memorandum from Edwin S. Smith to J. Warren Madden, Industrial
Economist, Aug. 31, 1935.
1 Oral history interview with David J. Saposs, July 22, 1968, at 4, on file in the Labor
Management Documentation Center, Cornell University.
12 I telephoned . . . Madden . . . made an appointment . . . and when I got
there he was exceedingly friendly and very polite, but the first thing he told
me . . . [was] "I haven't the slightest idea what you can do in the Board or for
the Board." Well, I began explaining to him what I thought could be done, but
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On the NLRB organizational chart, at least, the Division of Eco-
nomic Research attained status equal to that of the Legal Division, the
Trial Examining Division, and the Division of Publications. 13 But the
lawyers in the NLRB did not see it that way; an economist who worked
in the Division remembered: "As usual, in those days before computer
technology enabled the government economist to draw even with law-
yers in salary and status, the lawyers were running the show: 'After all
it is a law which is being enforced.' ,u A lawyer's attitude toward
economists was reflected as late as 1940 when Chairman Madden ex-
plained the relatively low salaries of the Board's economists to a House
Appropriations Committee: "it happens also that you can turn out
economists more or less en masse. I mean you can take almost any
kind of individual and if you put him through a certain type of educa-
tion he can do this kind of work."'15 Saposs, by his own description a
stubborn and "impudent"' 6 person, had been preparing for the kind
of work he was able to do at the NLRB ever since John R. Commons
introduced him to institutional economics and the "Brandeis tech-
nique."'17 He set out to convince the Board's lawyers that the NLRB
did need an economist.'8
The Division carried on two interrelated types of work: it gath-
ered economic material as evidence for use by the Board in particular
cases, and it made general studies of labor relations problems to guide
actually I myself wasn't very clear at that time as to what could be done, but I
had certain notions of a general nature. "Well," he said, "Millis and Biddle have
recommended you; you're hired." So, I started working.
rd. at 5.
13 Hearings Before the House Special Comm. to Investigate the National Labor Re-
lations Board, 76th Cong., 8d Sess., pt. 1, at 5111-12 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Smith
Committee Hearings].
14 Weisz, Research as a Tool of Administration: The Contribution of David J.
Saposs, in Tim LABOR MovwMErr: A RE-EXAMiNATiON 100-01 (J. Barbash ed. 1967).
15 Hearings on H.R. 10539 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appro-
priations, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 578 (1940).
16 Oral history interview, supra note 11, at 11.
17 Id. at 3. The "Brandeis technique" is a reference to the economic brief filed by
Mr. Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Mr. Saposs was born in the Russian Ukraine and came to the United States when he
was nine years old. Prior to his appointment as Chief Economist at the NLRB, he had
worked for the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, the New York State Department
of Labor, the Carnegie Corporation Americanization Study, the Inter-Church World
Movement, the Twentieth Century Fund, and the U.S. Department of Labor. He had
taught at the University of Wisconsin, the University of Toledo, and Brookwood Labor
College; had been the Education Director of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers; and
had written many books and articles in the field of labor relations.
18 Oral history interview, supra note 11, at 10-i1.
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the Board in its formulation of policy. The current case work19 of the
Division ranged from the provision of assistance in drafting complaints
(usually restricted to advising the Board regarding its jurisdiction
through investigations of corporate organization and descriptions of
interstate operations and properties) to the preparation of materials
for use at Board hearings or for inclusion in appellate court briefs.
These materials included "extracts from official sources or authoritative
writings on the economics of the respondent's industry or operations;
extracts from authoritative writings in the field of labor economics
on a general question of labor relations, such as the significance of
union recognition in collective bargaining; authenticated copies of
governmental reports on an aspect of respondent's labor relations" 20
and expert testimony given by the Chief Economist concerning such
labor relations problems as "written agreements, independent unions,
employer labor policies and activities, and the history of the respon-
dent's labor policy."21 In the Berkshire Knitting Mills 22 case, for exam-
ple, in which the company was charged with sponsoring a company
union and interfering with its employees' right to join the American
Federation of Hosiery Workers, Saposs testified about the historical
development of employer anti-labor policies and activities, the rev-
elations of the LaFollette Committee, and the findings of a Division of
Economic Research analysis of eighty-five "independent" unions.23
The Economic Research Division also analyzed employment records,
primarily to investigate section 8(3) charges 24 and to secure compliance
with back-pay and reinstatement orders.2 5
19 The Division's work is summarized in each of the first five NLRB Annual Reports:
1 NLRB ANN. REP. 60-66 (1936); 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 41-47 (1937); 3 NLR3B ANN. REP.
245-53 (1938); 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 152-57 (1939); 5 NLRB ANN. REP. 124-30 (1940).
20 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 249 (1938).
21 Id. at 249-50.
22 Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941).
28 NLRB files, Division of Economic Research, Statistical Analysis of 85 'Independent'
Unions and Readapted Company Unions, Research Memorandum No. 1, March 1938;
Memorandum from David J. Saposs to Messrs. Madden, E.S. Smith, D.W. Smith, Fahy,
Watts, Subject Matter Covered in Testimony at the Berkshire Knitting Mills Hearings,
Jan. 6, 1938; Score Employers As Causing Unrest, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1938, at 8, col. 4;
Accuses Industry of War on Union, id., Jan. 5, 1938, at 14, col. 1.
24 For example, when an employer was charged with having discriminated against
his employees through a reduction in work force, allegedly necessitated by business con-
ditions, employment records would be searched to check out seniority plans, merit rating
systems, employee production records, and so forth. See NLRB files, Division of Economic
Research, Investigation and Analysis of Employment Records and Personnel Policies in
Connection with 8(3) Cases, Aug. 24, 1939.
25 See NLRB files, Division of Economic Research, The Functions of the NLRB
Division of Economic Research, April 13, 1940, at 6.
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The Economic Division also prepared research memoranda2 6
("The Structure of AFL Unions," "The Role of Supervisory Employees
in Spreading Employer Views"), research outlines27 ("Effective Collec-
tive Bargaining," "Employer Labor Policies and Activities"), and
printed bulletins 8 ("Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bar-
gaining," "Governmental Protection of Labor's Right to Organize")
for use in future cases, for the information of the Board, and for gen-
eral policy planning. The bulletin "Written Trade Agreements in Col-
lective Bargaining" is typical of this aspect of the Division's work. This
bulletin was an expansion of the economic materials prepared for the
Board in the Inland Steel29 case, which involved a question of whether
the company's refusal to enter into a written agreement with the union
was a violation of the NLRA. The Division made a detailed study of
the theory and practice of collective bargaining, the historical develop-
ment of the written trade agreement, the forms and content of the
trade agreement, and the prevailing practice concerning the written
agreement in a selected group of industries. The study concluded that
a written trade agreement signed by both the employer and the union
was an integral part of collective bargaining, helping to reduce indus-
trial unrest, to provide a constitution for industrial democracy, and to
"[institutionalize] the whole collective bargaining process."3 0 The pub-
lished bulletin informed employers and unions of the Board's attitude
toward written collective bargaining contracts and provided documen-
tary support for the Board's position in future cases involving this
issue.31
26 See, e.g., NLRB files, Saposs, Statistical Analysis of 85 'Independent' Unions and
Readapted Company Unions, Research Memorandum No. 1, March 1938 (mimeographed);
Saposs, Digest of Testimony at Hearing in Case of Inland Steel Company and Steelworkers'
Organizing Committee, Research Memorandum No. 2, April 1938 (mimeographed); Saposs,
Ellickson & Sterm, Role of Supervisory Employees in Spreading Employer views, Research
Memorandum No. 3, Nov. 1938 (mimeographed); Cooper, Union-Employer Responsibility,
Research Memorandum No. 4, Jan. 1939 (mimeographed); Saposs, Structure of AFL
Unions, Research Memorandum No. 8, May 1939 (mimeographed).
27 See, e.g., NLRB files, Saposs, Employer Labor Practices and Activities, Research
Outline No. 6, March 1938 (mimeographed); Saposs & Cooper, Effective Collective Bar-
gaining, Research Outline No. 7, Dec. 1938 (mimeographed).
28 See, e.g., NLRB files, Governmental Protection of Labor's Right to Organize, Bull.
No. 1, Aug. 1936; The Effect of Labor Relations in the Bituminous Coal Industry, Bull.
No. 2, June 1938; Collective Bargaining in the Newspaper Industry, Bull. No. 3, Oct. 1938;
Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining, Bull. No. 4, Nov. 1939.
29 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1940).
30 NLRB files, Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining, Bull. No. 4, Nov.
1939, at xii, 251, 256.
81 NLRB files, Memorandum from David J. Saposs to Messrs. J. Warren Madden,
Edwin S. Smith, Donald W. Smith, Bulletin On Written Trade Agreements, Sept. 23, 1937.
[Vol. 55:821
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II
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Economic labor relations data helped build the case records on
which the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the Wag-
ner Act in 1937. A few years later, J. Warren Madden would tell the
Smith Committee that the NLRB's development of the records in
these cases was "a masterful job," "a perfectly splendid job," and that
"a better piece of legal work has not been done. '3 2 He might have
added that there was no better illustration of the potency of a coordi-
nated effort by the Board's legal depgrtments and the Division of
Economic Research.
The legal strategy was the core of the effort.3 The Board believed
that the Supreme Court's decision in Texas and New Orleans R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks3 4 had established that
the portions of the Act that pertained to the protection of self-organi-
zation were "reasonable means of carrying out a legitimate end" and
were not arbitrary or capricious. Although the provisions concerning
collective bargaining (particularly majority rule) were less certain to
be upheld, "the danger of an unfavorable ruling on this [due process]
issue [was] not great." 35 The Act was much more vulnerable on the
question of the commerce power, and on this point the choice of legal
arguments and the selection of test cases became most critical. The
Supreme Court in its Schechter 6 decision had already rejected argu-
ments based upon the more intangible obstructions to commerce men-
tioned in section 137 of the NLRA, such as the depressing effects on
32 13 Smith Committee Hearings, at 2710.
33 For an interesting discussion of the legal strategy in each of the Wagner Act cases,
see R. CoRTNER, THE WAGNER Acr CAsEs 89-194 (1964).
34 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
35 NLRB files, Memorandum (M410) from TJ. Emerson, Gerhard Van Arkel, Charles
Wood & Garnet Patterson, Selection of Test Cases Under the National Labor Relations
Act, July 9, 1935, at 1.
36 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
37 Section 1 of the NLRA reads:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and
other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety,
or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current
of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw
materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of com-
merce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d) causing
diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair
or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
1970]
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the market of wage competition and inadequate purchasing power38
or the alleged expansionary effects on commerce of the increased in-
come resulting from an equalization of bargaining power between
employer and employee. The Board decided that the foundation would
be the other congressional finding contained in section 1: that em-
ployer unfair labor practices lead to strikes and industrial unrest, which
physically obstruct the flow of commerce.
Mere declarations by the legislature, however, would not be
enough to justify the exercise of federal power. The legislative findings
had to be supported by facts if the Supreme Court was to give weight
and "great respect" to congressional conclusions. A review of the Su-
preme Court cases dealing with the weight to be given to legislative
findings indicated that the "independent examination of the facts by
the Court is without boundaries and may lead anywhere. Resort may
be had to the facts known judicially to the Court .... to the evidence
considered by Congress .... to facts argued before the Court, etc."' 9
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recog-
nized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental
to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encourag-
ing the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449.
38 Despite its mention in § 1, Charles Wyzanski, who presented oral arguments on
behalf of the NLRB in the Associated Press case, told the Supreme Court that "the
demoralization of the wage structure, may have something to do with the reasonableness
of the regulation, but it is not the foundation or the source of congressional power." ORAL
ARGUMENTS IN THE CASES ARISING UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR Aar AND THE NATIONAL LA-
BoR RE.ATIONS Acr BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 52,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1937). J. Warren Madden said in his oral argument in the Jones
Laughlin case that
I could imagine that there might be a sufficient connection between the wages
and the labor troubles, thereby stopping the flow of commerce, but I see no such
intimate connection whatever as there is between strikes and the flow of Com-
merce.
Id. at 115.
39 NLRB files, Memorandum of Stanley S. Surrey, The Relevance and Importance
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It was recommended that factual evidence supporting the congressional
findings of section 1 should be introduced into the case records and
"should not be limited to the reports of the Congressional Committees
and the record before these Committees, but should contain in addi-
tion other facts and material." 40
The statute as a whole was to be justified by the introduction of
certain general proofs: that interstate commerce was involved in the
particular case, that the employer did commit a specific unfair labor
practice, that such illegal acts have led or tend to lead to industrial
unrest which obstructs interstate commerce, and "that the remedy
adopted [was] in general an appropriate one." 41 The Board was ad-
vised, however, that it would be dangerous to stop with a general argu-
ment that might prove too much (by seeming to place all labor
relations under the supervision of the federal government) rather than
to go on to the specific case before the Court "and the effect of the
unfair labor practice in that case upon interstate commerce." 42 The
case-by-case approach was tactically designed, in part, to anticipate any
desire of the Supreme Court "to narrow a favorable decision to prevent
it from being too strong a precedent in favor of the regulation of labor
relations. '43 The Board was also reminded that the Court had shown
great interest in the business transactions of the Schechter Poultry
Corporation.44
The best test case, therefore, would be one in which the general
congressional findings of section 1 were clearly and concretely verified
by its particular facts: a case where the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices had caused his employees to strike and to shut down the plant.
In weaker cases, where the effect of the unfair labor practice was not
so clear, the Board would have to rely on the tendency of such practices
to lead to labor disputes that obstruct commerce. The question in that
type of case was "one of probability and the findings of Congress [were]
relevant to show what the probabilities [were];" moreover, "[t]he his-
tory of past labor disputes in which the employer was involved [was]
relevant to show what probably might occur in a future case. The labor
relations experience of the industry [was] likewise relevant. 45
of the Congressional Findings Contained in the National Labor Relations Act, Sept. 30,
1935, at 25-26.
40 Id. at 27.
41 NLRB files, Memorandum from Stanley S. Surrey to Charles Fahy, Extent to
Which the Board Must Go In Showing Effects Upon Interstate Commerce in a Particular
Case and Manner of Proof, Oct. 11, 1935, at 3.
42 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
43 Id. at 3-4.
44 Id. at 3.
45 Id. at 5,
1970]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In September 1935 an outline was drawn up detailing the kinds
of economic data needed to support the legal strategy. The significant
tests of the interstate nature of the respondent's business and industry
included the products produced, the relative size of the business and
the industry, the capital invested, sources of raw materials and manu-
factured parts, markets for finished products, the amount and value of
production shipped out of state, advertising in other states, and the
use of the products of other businesses and industries engaged in inter-
state commerce. The company's and the industry's labor relations his-
tories were searched for strikes or threats of strikes (particularly those
caused by employer unfair labor practices) and the effects of a stoppage
on interstate commerce. It was also considered important to develop
general labor relations facts that did not pertain directly to the specific
business or industry, such as the causes of strikes in general, the re-
moval of the causes of strikes by forbidding unfair labor practices, and
the advantages of "friendly adjustment through the machinery pro-
vided by the Act." 46
The Board's tactics in the field were no less important than the
strategy in Washington. From September 1935 to January 1936, Re-
gional Directors were required to submit all cases to the Board in
Washington for its approval before any complaints were issued.47 In
mid-1936, after the Supreme Court decided in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.48 that coal mining and manufacturing did not constitute com-
merce, the NLRB ordered its Regional Directors to hear fewer cases
and to scrutinize more closely those that were heard, even though it
would "probably be somewhat more difficult to retain the confidence
of Labor in the Board and in your office. ' 49 J. Warren Madden recalls
that the Board wanted to avoid "sick chicken"810 cases:
We were resolved that if possible... we would so arrange our
litigation that we would get to the Supreme Court with impressive
cases.... Our strategy ... was difficult to manage in this respect....
The Board was processing cases originating from its ... regional
offices ... and many of them were not large and impressive cases
46 NLRB files, Memorandum (M411), The Use of Economic Data to Support the
Constitutional Basis of the Wagner Labor Relations Act, Sept. 17, 1935, at 10-13.
47 NLRB files, Memorandum from Benedict Wolf to Ralph A. Lind, Jan. 15, 1936;
24 Smith Committee Hearings, at 5541-42. Section 3(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act gave the
General Counsel of the Board "final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the
investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section 10...
48 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
49 NLRB files, Memorandum from Benedict Wolf to Regional Directors, May 21,
1936; 24 Smith Committee Hearings, at 5542-44.
50 A reference to Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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and so there was danger that... if the Board decided such a case
*.. and then the employer,.. . as he had a right to do, took the
case into a United States Circuit Court of Appeals, and got it de-
cided there... then that case would be ready.., for the next step,
a petition to the Supreme Court of the United States. And so we
might find ourselves in the Supreme Court with a case which we
would not have selected for that purpose.
Our regional directors, on the whole, had good relations with
union officials and very often they could persuade the union officials
to cooperate in our strategy... and to withdraw a charge involving
an unimpressive case of that kind,... by simply saying to the union
officials, "if we get the wrong case to the Supreme Court and lose it,
why then our whole project is destroyed. And so be patient ...."51
First preference was to be given to cases arising in those industries
where the employees were actually in interstate commerce, such as
interstate transportation and communication. The next-best industries
were those which the Supreme Court had already designated as being
in the flow of interstate commerce, such as stockyards, packing houses,
grain elevators, and milling companies. Although rated third best and
"generally less desirable," test cases in manufacturing could not be
delayed since they constituted the bulk of the NLRB's potential juris-
diction.5 2
The Board brought along an interstate bus case (Washington,
Virginia and Maryland Coach Co.), an interstate communication case
(Associated Press), and three interstate manufacturing operations (Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp., Fruehauf Trailer Co., and Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co.).5 3 The Board took this varied set of cases, repre-
sentative of the broad scope of the NLRB's potential jurisdiction, into
four circuit courts of appeals54 for review that would provide the Su-
preme Court with "a range of thinking of circuit court judges about
the statute . . . ."5 Ironically, it was because the NLRB lost all of its
manufacturing cases in the circuit courts that it was able to hold back
these more doubtful cases until they could be accompanied to the Su-
51 Oral history interview with J. Warren Madden, Nov. 2, 1968, at 44-45, on file in
the Labor Management Documentation Center, Cornell University.
52 NLRB files, Memorandum (M410), from T.I. Emerson, Gerhard Van Axkel, Charles
Wood, Garnet Patterson, Selection of Test Cases Under the National Labor Relations Act,
July 9, 1935; Memorandum from Benedict Wolf to Regional Directors, May 21, 1936; 24
Smith Committee Hearings, at 5542-44.
53 See cases cited in note 4 supra.
54 Associated Press and Friedman-Harry Marks were taken to the Second Circuit,
Jones & Laughlin to the Fifth Circuit, Fruehauf Trailer to the Sixth Circuit, and Wash-
ington, Virginia &" Maryland Coach Co. to the Fourth Circuit. "
55 Oral history interview with Charles Fahy, July 23, 1968, at 21, on file in the Labor
Management Documentation Center, Cornell University.
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preme Court by the strong interstate transportation and communica-
tion cases."8
Although the same due process argument ran through all the cases,
the Jones and Laughlin case was developed almost entirely around the
commerce question, the single issue of the Wagner Act's application
to manufacturing.57 The Division of Economic Research therefore
made its major effort in that case and supplied the kind of economic
and industrial relations evidence essential to the success of the legal
strategy. Many industrial relations experts, including William Leiser-
son, Sumner Slichter, John A. Fitch, Hugh Kerwin, and David Saposs,
testified at the hearing in the Jones and Laughlin case in Washington,
D.C., in April 1936. Their experience and opinions ranged over gen-
eral industrial relations "facts": that employers' refusals to recognize
unions had caused widespread industrial strife in the nation's basic
industries, that outstanding strikes (the Southwest Railway strike in
1886, the anthracite coal strike in 1902, the steel strike in 1919,
and so forth) had seriously obstructed commerce, that unfair labor
practices had been a major cause of industrial conflict, that collective
bargaining had been working most satisfactorily in many industries,
and that "[g]overnmental intervention of some kind [had] been the
rule in major labor disputes for more than half a century."5 81 The eco-
nomic testimony then shifted, as required by the legal strategy, to the
economic structure and labor relations history of the steel industry:
the industry's place in the American economic system, its concentration
of ownership and integration of production, its national and inter-
national market-and the Homestead strike of 1892, the U.S. Steel
Corporation strikes of 1901 and 1910, the steel strike of 1919, the
threatened steel strike of 1934, the company union movement, and
the industry's use of espionage and the Coal and Iron Police to pre-
vent union organization for collective bargaining.59 The NLRB's Su-
preme Court brief summarized this expert testimony and supported it
with references to government reports, scholarly journals, and labor
relations textbooks and histories.60 The Economic Division also sup-
56 CORTNER, supra note 33, at 113, 133, 317.
57 NLRB files, Memorandum from Charles Fahy to J. Warren Madden, Supreme
Court Arguments, Nov. 23, 1986, at 2.
58 NLRB Division of Economic Research, Government Protection of Labor's Right to
Organize 33, Bull. No. 1, Aug. 1936. These hearings before the NLRB were held in Wash-
ington, D.C., from April 2 to April 8, 1956. The verbatim testimony of the expert wit-
nesses appears in the Re'cord at 398-970, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d
998 (5th Cir. 1936).
59 NLRB Division of Economic Research, supra note 58, at 33-45.
60 Brief for Petitioner at 21-31, NLRB v. Jones 9- Laughlin Steel Corp., 501 Us. 1
(1937).
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plied the last and most critical economic evidence needed to complete
the lawyers' plan of attack-the interstate nature of the operations
of the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, particularly its Aliquippa
plant where the alleged unfair labor practices occurred.6'
Jones and Laughlin told the Supreme Court that, whereas the
Board had "made some effort to adhere to the ordinary standards of
relevancy" at the opening hearings in Pittsburgh, "the bars to irrel-
evant and prejudicial material were entirely dropped" 62 in Washington.
The company characterized the economic data as "a miscellany of eco-
nomic and political opinions," "hypothetical evidence," and pure
speculation based upon magazine articles, newspaper clippings,, doc-
toral theses on labor relations, and "a best seller, 'Steel Dictator.' ",63
The corporation's most serious complaint was that the "evils in other
branches of the industry and in other industries were used to blacken
the reputation of the respondent." 64 The employer maintained, finally,
that since its operation had not been interrupted by the strike or im-
paired in the slightest way by the discharge of the complaining em-
ployees, "[i]t [was] a defiance of reason and good judgment to argue
that guesswork evidence ... can bridge the distance between the dis-





Only those who were privy to the Supreme Court's deliberations
know why the Court sustained the Wagner Act. It has been denied
that the Supreme Court (particularly Chief Justice Hughes and Asso-
ciate Justice Roberts) changed its judicial views for political reasons. 66
When it is recognized, however, that the government's evidence in the
Carter case "had shown beyond doubt that labor disputes in the coal
industry had interfered not only with interstate commerce in coal itself
but with interstate rail transportation and a great proportion of all
industry as well, '67 it is reasonable to discount the effect of the Board's
61 Brief, supra note 60, at 52-72.
62 Brief for Respondent at 19, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 20.
65 Id. at 21.
16 See 2 M. PUSEY_ CHARLES EVANS 'HUGHES 766-72 (1951); Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. Rnv. 311 (1955).




strategy and arguments and to give major credit to environmental con-
ditions-President Roosevelt's decisive re-election victory in 1936,
which made his Court Plan a more realistic threat to the independence
of the federal judiciary, and the CIO organizing drives in steel and auto
and other mass production industries that had been marked by violence
and the sit-down strikes. For whatever reason, the Court was ready to
have its mind changed, and in the Jones and Laughlin case the Court
had available and relied on the Board's economic material to justify
its rejection of precedent. The Court, in fact, followed the economic
outline step by step:
We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national
life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects [on
commerce] in an intellectual vacuum ....
... Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most
prolific causes of strife ....
These questions have frequently engaged the attention of
Congress and have been the subject of many inquiries. The steel
industry is one of the great basic industries of the United States,
with ramifying activities affecting interstate commerce at every
point. The Government aptly refers to the steel strike of 1919-1920
with its far-reaching consequences. The fact that there appears to
have been no major disturbance in that industry in the more re-
cent period did not dispose of the possibilities of future and like
dangers to interstate commerce which Congress was entitled to
foresee and to exercise its protective power to forestall. It is not
necessary again to detail the facts as to the respondent's enterprise.
Instead of being beyond the pale, we think that it presents in a
most striking way the close and intimate relation which a man-
ufacturing industry may have to interstate commerce .... 68
In support of this portion of its opinion, the Supreme Court made
footnote references to documents supplied by the Division of Economic
Research: the Final Report of the Industrial Commission (1902); the
Report of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission (1902); the Final
Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations (1916); the National
War Labor Board, Principles and Rules of Procedure (1919); and Sen-
ate Report No. 289, Investigating Strikes in Steel Industry.69
The influence of the Division of Economic Research's work on
the Supreme Court was also debated within the NLRB itself. Charles
Fahy, NLRB General Counsel during these critical years, agreed that
it was "prudent, wise, and helpful" to present economic data to the
Supreme Court, but felt that the economists "thought their contri-
68 301 U.S. at 41-43.
69 See 301 U.S. at 43 nn.8 & 9.
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bution was more important than it was." 70 The Economic Division's
response to the Supreme Court's decisions was made in the assertive
language of an insecure department seeking to solidify its position and
to attain first-class citizenship in the organization. The Division's
strongest declarations went beyond picayune squabbles over profes-
sional prestige to question the appropriateness and the value of the
essentially legalistic approach the Board had adopted. The Division of
Economic Research's section of the NLRB's Second Annual Report,
for example, asserted the economic and sociological basis of the NLRA
and told of a "trend toward enlightenment" wherein "the public con-
sciousness is being focused on the economic factors inherent in the
problems confronting the Board."7' The enthusiasm with which the
report was written led to a disconcerting (at least to the Board's law-
yers) exaggeration:
The decisions of the Supreme Court with their full use of the
economic evidence presented in each case, coupled with the com-
plete disregard for finely spun legal distinctions reaffirmed the ap-
propriateness of the "economic approach" for which the famous
Brandeis brief was the precedent.72
One week after the Wagner Act decisions, David Saposs came
forward with specific proposals intended to get the Division of Eco-
nomic Research involved more substantially in the NLRB's case work.
The Chief Economist wanted to have the NLRB's jurisdiction in fu-
ture cases decided in the field "by a member of the staff trained in
economics, working in cooperation with the regional attorney." 73 He
requested that "in important cases" an economist proficient in labor
70 From a personal standpoint ... and I say this with a good deal of respect for
the economic data, from a personal standpoint it was not so important to me as
a lawyer ....
... I think, and I wouldn't wish to emphasize this at all, I think there might
have been some rather slight feeling on my part, and perhaps some of the other
lawyers, that some of the economic experts thought their contribution was more
important than it was.... I think they made an important contribution, but I
thought more in terms of a lawyer using economic data, rather than in terms of
an economist which [sic] might downplay the legal part of the problems. I think
there was some pride of profession.
Oral history interview with Charles Fahy, July 23, 1968, at 28, 30-31, on file in the Labor
Management Documentation Center, Cornell University.
71 2 NLRB ANN. RP. 46 (1937).
72 Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
73 NLRB files, Memorandum from David J. Saposs to J. Warren Madden, Edwin S.
Smith, Donald W. Smith, Charles Fahy, Robert Watts, Nathan Witt, Benedict Wolf,




relations "assist, not only in the preparation of evidence prior to the
hearing, but also at the hearing," and that after the hearing there be
close cooperation between the Division and the review attorney han-
dling the case.74 Saposs also recommended that data for all major in-
dustries be prepared, that educational material on appropriate labor
relations issues be published "for the public, employers, workers, and
legislators," and that the NLRB establish "for all our staff" a reading
course, supplemented by lectures, "in the history and practices of labor
relations .... 75
The Board's General Counsel, on the contrary, told Mr. Saposs
that "any advice to the Regional Attorneys on [the] interpretation of
Supreme Court decisions" should go out from the office of the General
Counsel.76 In a memorandum to Mr. Saposs, dated May 13, 1937, he
said:
Should we obtain soon several Circuit Court decisions to the effect
that the jurisdiction of the Board applies to ordinary manufacturing
enterprises engaged in interstate commerce, which I am convinced
we should, we could then eliminate, in ordinary manufacturing
cases, all economic material except that which is necessary to prove
the operations of the particular respondent.77
Charles Fahy was opposed to the establishment of any general
rules governing the use of economic data and suggested, instead, that
the use of such materials in "borderline cases" and in circuit court
briefs should be treated "as a separate problem in each case as it arises."
He also maintained that it was "no longer necessary to prove the his-
tory of labor relations in ordinary manufacturing cases," that it was
not feasible for the Economic Division to review drafts of Board deci-
sions, and that no "general preparation of material for Circuit Court
74 Among other duties, attorneys in the Board's Review Division, which was abolished
by the 1947 amendments, analyzed the records of hearings held in the regions and before
the Board in Washington, and prepared digests of the record for oral presentation to the
members of the Board. The review attorney would also write formal opinions at the
direction of Board members. Id. at 2.
75 Id. at 3. See also NLRB files, Memorandum from David J. Saposs to J. Warren
Madden, Edwin S. Smith, Donald W. Smith, Suggested Subjects for General Research by
the Division of Economic Research, May 25, 1937, at 1-3. Educational literature would
include studies of collective bargaining, union responsibility, the bargaining unit, bar-
gaining in good faith, anti-union attitudes of employer associations, independent unions,
and sit-down strikes.
76 NLRB flies, Memorandum from Charles Fahy to David J. Saposs, June 12, 197.
77 NLRB files, Memorandum from Charles Fahy to David J. Saposs, Economic Ma-
terial as Evidence in Hearings, May 13, 1937, at I.
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Briefs should be undertaken by the Economic Division" except to re-
view any economic material which a particular brief might contain.7
The Board sustained the recommendations of General Counsel Fahy.79
The internal disagreement over the proper role of the Division
of Economic Research continued as the tremendous post-April 1937
expansion of the NLRB's workload increased the amount, if not the
scope, of the Division's activities. In December of 1937, Mr. Saposs
complained to the members of the Board that no regional attorney
had followed Mr. Fahy's instructions that they send weekly lists of
difficult "borderline" cases to the Legal Division and to the Division of
Economic Research:
[M]atters of jurisdiction in difficult and borderline cases depend
on a knowledge of business methods, corporate structure, and other
economic data. The interests of vast numbers of poorly paid and
underpaid workers are involved who sorely need labor organization
protection. Yet their requests for Board intervention is being de-
cided by the Legal Division on totally inadequate economic data.8 0
Several months later, Saposs objected when he discovered that cer-
tain attorneys and trial examiners had been asked to evaluate the Chief
Economist's oral testimony and the economic materials used in Board
hearings.81 As another indication of the way things were going, in
August 1938 the Associate General Counsel instructed all NLRB at-
torneys to submit requests for economic data to the Associate General
78 Id. at 1-2. See also NLRB files, Memorandum from Charles Fahy to J. Warren
Madden, Edwin S. Smith, Donald W. Smith, Robert Watts, Benedict Wolf, Nathan Witt,
Philip Levy, David J. Saposs, Reconsideration of Economic Data Required in Cases Be-
fore the Board, Sept. 2, 1937, at 1-3.
79 See NLRB files, Memorandum from Charles Fahy to Regional Attorneys and At-
torneys in Regional Offices, Jurisdictional Proof and Cooperation Between Legal Staff
and Economic Division, Sept. 22, 1937. The Economic Division expanded from 4 to 12
members between June 30, 1937, and June 30, 1938, but this was due to an increased
NLRB case load rather than to an expansion of the Division's jurisdiction. 13 Smith
Committee Hearings, at 2728.
80 NLRB files, Memorandum from David J. Saposs to J. Warren Madden, Donald W.
Smith, Edwin S. Smith, Jurisdiction in Borderline Cases, Dec. 22, 1937, at 1.
81 NLRB files, Memorandum from David J. Saposs to George Pratt, Opinions of
Trial Examiners on Economic Material in Board Hearings, Aug. 23, 1938, at 1. See also
Memorandum from David J. Saposs to Robert B. Watts, Economic Data for Hearings in
the Field, Aug. 23, 1938.
In one of these memoranda the Board's Assistant Chief Trial Examiner called the
Chief Economist's oral testimony in one case "completely worthless" and concluded that
"[w]hile there may be cases on which economic material is relevant, I am definitely of the
opinion that it should be abandoned in the usual run of cases." 25 Smith Committee Hear-
ings, at 6774.
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Counsel and to cease direct correspondence with the Economic Divi-
sion.82 By January 1939 Saposs was resisting proposed reductions in
the staff of the Division of Economic Research. 3
William Leiserson, a product of the University of Wisconsin and
a student of John R. Commons (as was David Saposs), became a mem-
ber of the Board on June 1, 1939. Several months later he defended
the Division of Economic Research in public hearings held by the
Special House Committee to Investigate the NLRB (the Smith Com-
mittee). The Committee introduced into evidence a letter which
Leiserson had written to Professor Commons on March 27, 1940, which
is such a clear and forceful exposition of the "economist's" conception
of the proper administration of the Act that it is quoted at length:
I would summarize the whole situation by saying that there is noth-
ing the matter with the law at all. The whole trouble and most of
the public clamor, I am convinced, stems from two things: One,
misconception on the part of the Board and its lawyers as to the
basic... purpose of the Act; Two, poor administration.
You have no doubt read of the Smith Committee's recom-
mendation to amend the Act by separating the so-called prose-
cuting from the judicial functions of the Board. This proposal
makes plain the basic misconception regarding the work of the
Board. As a matter of fact, we have neither prosecuting nor ju-
dicial powers. We are really a branch of the Congress for investiga-
tion and fact-finding purposes similar to the Interstate Commerce
Commission or to the Wisconsin Industrial Commission....
The Board and its lawyers can't seem to grasp this idea ....
The lawyers seem to have the notion that the only way to arrive at
the truth is by two opposing lawyers trying to keep things out of
the record, and whatever gets in, that is the truth. They have no
understanding of the method of inquiry or investigation that we
call economic or social research. This explains the recommenda-
tion that Dave Saposs's economic research division should be abol-
ished....
The problem is really more far reaching than the N.L.R.B.
82 NLRB files, Memorandum (M609) from Robert B. Watts to all attorneys, Economic
Data for Hearings in the Field, Aug. 9, 1938, at 1:
Effective at once, all requests for economic data or for the services of the
Chief Economist or members of his staff will be submitted solely to the Associate
General Counsel, together with a statement of the reason for desiring the data or
services in any particular case. The past practice of sending a duplicate request
to the Economic Division will be discontinued.
In the event the Associate General Counsel approves a request in a specific
instance, he will arrange directly with the Economic Division for its participation
in the case. Until after such clearance, there will be no correspondence between
the attorneys in the Regional Offices and the Economic Division.
83 See NLRB files, Memorandum from David J. Saposs to J. Warren Madden, Recom-
mended Reclassifications in the Division of Economic Research, Jan. 16, 1989, at 1.
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itself. It threatens the whole idea of scientific investigation and ad-
ministrative control as it was thought out and worked out in Wis-
consin years ago. As new administrative agencies have been created
here, great numbers of lawyers have been recruited to man them.
These have been trained in new ideas about administrative law
that are now current in the law schools. Their knowledge of labor
relations, for example, is confined to decisions of courts on labor
cases....
I have had occasion to say that it won't be long before we will
have an association of practitioners before the Labor Board, to
whose members both employers and unions will be forced to go to
get the benefits of the Act because no layman could understand the
legal practices and procedures. This is the trend here now in Wash-
ington, and it threatens, I think, to develop a new body of tech-
nical law just as ill-adapted to dealing with modern problems as
the common law and the equity law now are .... I think it threat-
ens the whole idea of flexible and informed handling of modern
economic problems by expert administrative agencies.8 4
Charles Fahy was equally clear and forceful when he gave the
Smith Committee a lawyer's reaction to Leiserson's letter to Commons:
[In] unfair labor practice cases, as distinct from representation
cases, it is my opinion that Dr. Leiserson's views as expressed in the
Commons letter have no relation to reality and are impossible of
acceptance....
*.. Congress itself provided for a complaint, an answer, and a
hearing in which the parties could be represented and introduce
relevant testimony....
Now it is true that the orders of the Board have no compulsory
effect until approved by the court, but it is also true that the court
must give great weight to findings of fact of the Board and to the
type of remedial order which the administrative agency has applied
in the particular case. So that the fact that the Board orders, in
order to be effective, must be approved by the court, is not sufficient
to do away with the necessity of the kind of procedure set forth in
the [statute] and used by the Board. There can be no substitution
solely of economic and social research, notwithstanding the great
value of such research in some cases on certain aspects of some cases.
To indict the Board or its legal staff for following the requirements
with respect to procedure contained in the statute itself and re-
quired by the Constitution, by affording a trial is, to me, fantastic.8 5
Mr. Fahy's judgment was sustained in 1947 when Congress reaffirmed
and expanded the essentially legalistic procedures which he had de-
fended and which Mr. Leiserson had feared.
84 24 Smith Committee Hearings, at 4977-78.




THE SMITH COMMITrEE INVESTIGATION
The Smith Committee, however, was interested in other things.
The Committee's composition reflected the newly developed, loosely
organized, but politically important coalition of conservative Repub-
licans and Southern Democrats, which vigorously opposed the Pres-
ident, the New Deal, organized labor, and the whole concept of
administrative law.8 6 The Smith Committee was so consumed with the
pursuit of these larger objectives that it never gave careful considera-
tion to the proper role of economic analysis in the work of the NLRB.
Instead, the Committee conducted a personal attack on David J. Saposs,
charging that he advocated the "destruction of the capitalistic system
in this country,"87 and recommended that the Division of Economic
Research be abolished.8 Committee member Routzohn gave the House
of Representatives his opinion of Saposs: "You have heard of Saposs.
If he is not a Communist, then we have not any Communists in this
country or in Russia."8' 9
Earl Latham's account of this episode shows that the Committee
was clearly wrong.90 Although Latham claims that there were some
Communists at the NLRB in 1939, the Committee had suspicions but
no facts and did not seriously pursue the hunt.9' The ironic conse-
quence was that on the basis of some carefully selected extracts from
Saposs's writings and several innuendoes and misrepresentations, 2 the
Smith Committee brought down one of the most ardent anti-Com-
munists at the NLRB, and with him the Division of Economic Re-
search. The two New Deal Democrats on the Committee vigorously
86 The Smith Committee "majority" consisted of Chairman Howard Smith of Virginia
(a Democrat who had survived President Roosevelt's purge list in the 1938 elections) and
Republicans Charles Routzohn of Ohio and Charles Halleck of Indiana. The "minority"
was comprised of New Deal Democrats Abe Murdock of Utah and James Healey of
Massachusetts.
87 17 Smith Committee Hearings, at 3418. The Committee's documentation consisted
of a number of carefully chosen extracts from Saposs's writings, the fact that Saposs was
bor in Russia, that he belonged to a Socialist Club as a student at the University of
Wisconsin, and that he was a faculty member at Brookwood College, labeled a Com-
munist school by the AFL. Id.
88 The Smith Committee's recommendations appear in H.R. REP. No. 1902, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 37 & n.1 (1940).
89 86 CoNG. REC. 7730 (1940) (remarks of Congressman Routzohn).
90 E. LATHAM, THE COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON: FROM THE NEW DEAL
TO MCCARTHY 124-50 (1966).
91 Id. at 137-38.
92 17 Smith Committee Hearings, at 3413-86.
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defended the NLRB and, in particular, the Division of Economic Re-
search but were unwilling to defend Mr. Saposs.
93
Although he surely was not an impartial and unaffected observer,
Saposs believed that he was brought down by a conspiracy. He main-
tained that the Committee's minority report was written with the
assistance of NLRB staff members. The New Deal congressmen, accord-
ing to Saposs, wanted to protect the NLRB but did not want to write
a report that would whitewash the Board at a time when public crit-
icism of its work had become a crucial political issue. Saposs contended
"that one way to meet that situation was to criticize me [Saposs] as a
person who had had bad connections and who was definitely biased.1
94
According to Saposs, the Communists at the NLRB, whom the Smith
Committee never reached, were delighted not only to part with a trou-
blesome anti-Communist but also to use that hollow offering to appease
those who suspected a left-wing influence at the Board.95 Saposs also
concluded that in so far as the Legal Division was concerned it "would
have liked to have retained the economic division [but it wanted] to
have somebody head up the economic division who was a little more
amenable to the lawyers and less . . . controversial."9 6 However, given
the Board's support in 1937 of Mr. Fahy's position concerning the
Division of Economic Research, it was perhaps inevitable that the role
of the Division would have been a limited one in any event.
In June 1940 the House Appropriations Committee, influenced
by the Smith Committee's recommendations, severely cut the appropri-
ation for the Division of Economic Research. The Board then changed
the name of the Division of Economic Research to the Technical Ser-
vice Division but retained Saposs and limited him to technical work,
such as gathering case statistics and computing back-pay awards in 8(3)
cases.97 The House Appropriations Committee saw this as an attempt
93 Apparently the real explanation for the amendment proposed by our colleagues
was the testimony in the record with reference to economic philosophy of Dr.
Saposs, head of the Economic Research unit. If the excerpts from his writings
which were read into the record are a fair example of his views we disapprove
as strongly as our colleagues of a person entertaining such views holding an im-
portant position in the Government. We do not feel, however, that the abolition
of a whole division performing a useful function is a logical solution of dealing
with the problem of one office holder whose views are abhorrent to our committee.
H.R. REP. No. 1902, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 22 (1940). Saposs vigorously objected
to the "qualified manner" of this minority report in a letter to Congressmen Healey and
Murdock, 25 Smith Committee Hearings, at 6779-84.
94 Oral history interview, supra note 11, at 83.
95 Id. at 83-87.
96 Id. at 87.
97 NLRB files, Letter from J. Warren Madden to the Comptroller General of the
United States, Aug. 10, 1940.
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by the Board to circumvent the House of Representatives's intention
to follow the Smith Committee recommendations and abolish the
Division of Economic Research.98 The Division was finally eliminated
by the provisions of Public Law No. 812, approved in October 1940.99
Senator Hayden of the Senate subcommittee that considered this bill
gave his own impression of why the House persisted in its efforts to
get rid of even the narrow functions of the Technical Service Division:
I think you [the Board] would have found no difficulty if you
had used other personnel; I think that is the difficulty. In case the
personnel you now have on the job should die and if you then
should have to find someone else to do that work-and I think you
could find such people-then I think your trouble would be largely
solved. 100
The Smith Committee also cited the use of data provided by the
Division of Economic Research in the Inland Steel case as one of its
prime examples of the NLRB's improper administration of justice.
The Committee charged that the NLRB, "through Secretary Witt,"
had helped to plan the attack of the Steel Workers' Organizing Com-
mittee against Youngstown, Republic, and Inland Steel in the Little
Steel Strike of 1937, and had deliberately provoked "a test case for a
Board decision that a written contract was essential to establish the
good faith of the employer in collective bargaining. '101 The Committee,
in particular, pointed to
the curious spectacle of the Board directing Mr. Saposs, chief
of its Division of Economic Research, to prepare evidence on the
question of a signed agreement and then using that evidence as a
basis for its decision that a written agreement is an essential ingre-
dient of collective bargaining.102
The Inland Steel case became the focal point for the Committee's
antagonism toward the entire administrative process, an antagonism
"founded upon the inarticulate major premise that justice administered
by men in black robes is superior to justice administered by men in
sack suits."103 But in fact, whether the Board was guilty of "acts akin
to entrapment" or not, the Smith Committee chose a very weak case
98 NLRB files, Letter from Hon. M. C. Tarver to J. Warren Madden, July 2, 1940.
99 Act of October 9, 1940, ch. 780, 54 Stat. 1037.
100 Hearings on H.R. 10539 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropri-
ations, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 317 (1940).
101 H.R. REP. No. 1902, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 13 (1940).
102 Id. at 15.
103 Gellhorn & Linfield, Politics and Labor Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of
NLRB Procedure, 39 COLUm. L. Rav. 339, 356 (1939).
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with which to attack the role of the Division of Economic Research.
Saposs's evidence concerning the extensive use of written trade agree-
ments and their contributions to industrial peace and stability was
presented orally at the Inland hearing and was made part of the record
in the case. Inland Steel had full opportunity to rebut Mr. Saposs's
testimony and to present its own evidence and, although neither of
the Smith Committee's majority reports to Congress'0" mentions it,
Inland Steel took full advantage of that opportunity. The company
presented Dr. Raleigh Stone of the University of Chicago School of
Business, who attempted to refute Saposs's documentary evidence and
conclusions both in oral testimony at the hearing and in a lengthy non-
legal brief which he prepared at the request of the Board's Trial Ex-
aminer.1'05 By putting all of the economic evidence into the case record
so that there could be cross-examination, rebuttal, and written and
oral arguments, the NLRB had, contrary to the claims of the Smith
Committee, equitably reconciled the requirements of procedural fair-
ness with the need for the full and free use of the agency's expertise.10 6
The Smith Committee may have felt that these were only the
appearances of procedural fairness and concluded that the NLRB was
biased because it had already made up its mind about the written agree-
ment and had used Saposs's evidence simply to buttress this precon-
ceived point of view. But in an even clearer case of alleged prejudg-
ment, FTC v. Cement Institute,0 7 the Supreme Court held that such
preconceptions do not disqualify the agency from passing judgment.
The Federal Trade Commission had made reports to Congress and
to the President and had testified before congressional committees
clearly indicating (long before it issued the complaint in the Cement
Institute case) that the Commission believed that the multiple basing
point system violated the Sherman Act. One of the cement companies
that had agreed to use this system of pricing asked the FTC to dis-
qualify itself from passing on the issues because the Commission was
"prejudiced and biased." The Supreme Court denied the request
primarily because of the industry's opportunity to produce evidence
to change the Commission's views.'08
Justice is best served by making the agency's ideas and positions
104 H.R. Rx'. No. 3109, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1941); H.R. REP. No. 1902, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1940).
105 24 Smith Committee Hearings, at 5951-53.
106 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 267 (1959).
107 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
108 Id. at 701.
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known to the parties at the earliest possible stage in the case'09 and
by giving the parties the "opportunity to meet in the appropriate
fashion any materials that influence decision.""10 Justice is not served
by always futile efforts to insist on minds untouched by experience or
values or by attempts to keep the administrative agency from utilizing
all of its experience and expertise.
CONCLUSION
Authorities in the field of administrative law have long main-
tained that one of the principal reasons for choosing the administrative
process over the legislative or judicial is the need for continuous expert
supervision. This most important attribute of the administrative
process depends upon staff work organized so that all pertinent ex-
pertise can be utilized fully in every aspect of each decision. Congress
has limited the effectiveness of the NLRB by prohibiting the Board
from conducting any sustained and expert study of the industrial rela-
tions dimensions of the problems that confront the Board.
The employers and unions that come before the NLRB frequently
have access to the highest-priced talent and most sophisticated aids to
data collection and analysis. An administrative agency, however, unlike
a court, has an obligation to seek information beyond that presented
by the interest groups that appear before it. The NLRB is solely re-
sponsible for the implementation of congressional intent as expressed
in the Taft-Hartley Act.
The Board, for example, is currently considering a proposed
remedy that would require an employer, found guilty of a refusal to
bargain, to
[c]ompensate . .. each of its employees for the monetary value of
the minimum additional benefits.. . which it is reasonable to con-
clude that Union would have been able to obtain through collective
bargaining ... for the period commencing with the date of the
Respondent's formal refusal to bargain .... M
The advocates and opponents of this novel remedy have laid some
complex economic argumentation before the Board concerning time
109 DAVIS, supra note 106, at 204.
110 Id. at 269.
111 Ex-Cell-O Corp., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 80-67, at 18 (Case No. 25-CA-2377,
1967). See also Zinke's Foods, Inc., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 662-66 (Cases No. 30-CA-372,
S0-RC-400, 1966); Herman Wilson Lumber Co., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 757-66 (Case No.
26-CA-2536, 1966); Rasco Olympia Inc., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 167-66 (Case No. 19-CA-
3187, 1966).
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series and cross-sectional analyses, geographic wage differentials, the
structure of the local labor market, the use of wage comparisons within
the company and the industry (or among similar industries), and the
use of area standards, standard collective bargaining contracts, and the
wage data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Board is
being asked to determine appropriate objective standards by which
such benefits could be estimated and to decide if it is possible to dis-
tinguish the union's impact on relative wage levels from other wage-
influencing factors such as age, skill, labor market conditions, nature
and size of the industry, productivity, cost of living, and an employer's
ability and willingness to pay. The NLRB should have the economic
expertise needed to make these decisions.
An agency denied the right to conduct its own economic analysis
must get along without information that could contribute to a sound
conclusion, rely upon the argumentation and materials of the parties
that appear before it, or act surreptitiously. If the agency succumbs to
what must be a great temptation to violate the prohibition, it will be
certain not to make known the extra-record information and, as a re-
sult, the parties will never have an opportunity to meet it. An ad-
ministrative agency, moreover, runs a great risk of failing to carry out
congressional intent if it becomes dependent upon the parties that
appear before it for certain kinds of information:
The prime weakness of the regulatory agency is not the much-
publicized tendency toward governmental excesses but is the little-
recognized tendency of the agency sooner or later to succumb in
greater or lesser degree to the persuasions of powerful groups that
are supposed to be regulated. This weakness is immeasurably aggra-
vated if the agency must decide particular cases exclusively upon
the basis of materials supplied to it by private interests. 112
There is little doubt, however, that the adversary process will
remain the predominant and probably the most suitable procedure
for dealing with labor relations problems. The congressional prohibi-
tion found in section 4(a), therefore, has had its most serious conse-
quences in the areas of policy determination rather than in the hand-
ling of individual Board cases. It has, for example, prevented the
Board from conducting its own studies of how its administration of
the law is working in practice. The Board should be free to conduct
a series of impact studies such as Philip Ross's evaluation of the effect
of section 8(a)(5) upon employers and unions."3 For instance, what
112 DAVis, supra note 106, at 277-78.
113 P. Ross, THE LABOR LAw IN ACTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADNirNsRATrvE PRoczs
UNDER THE TAPr-HARTLEY ACT (1966).
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in fact has been the effect of the Board's Fibreboard1 4 decision? How
has that decision affected management rights, efficiency, economic and
technological developments, management decisions at the work place,
and the labor-management relationship? As George Shultz, the Secre-
tary of Labor, so effectively understated it, "Answers to such questions
would give more meaning to discussions of legislative or administra-
tive actions." 115 The Board should also be free to determine if its
remedies are producing the desired effects. It is dismaying to realize
that the NLRB's basic reinstatement remedy, after thirty-four years,
has not been subjected to comprehensive empirical investigation to
assess its effectiveness. 116
There is another area where careful economic-industrial relations
studies would be most valuable. Since the Supreme Court's decision
in the Wyman-Gordon"17 case, the Solicitor of the NLRB has suggested
that "although the Board may not feel legally compelled to do so, it
might nevertheless deem it desirable in the public interest to venture
forth on rule-making in certain subject-matter zones."u 8 These "sub-
ject zones" could include the Board's jurisdictional standards, certain
election rules, the contract-bar doctrine, the model authorization card,
and standards for fines which unions assess against their members.1 9
Substantive rule-making would involve the NLRB in considerations
well beyond the problems of adjudicating a single case-and, since a
substantive rule would apply to all unions and all employers subject
to the Act, the Board should be able to run extensive field studies to
discover if the proposed rule has an empirical foundation.
These suggested uses of economic and industrial relations data
would contribute to more knowledgeable judgments and policy choices;
yet the NLRB is the only administrative agency forbidden to seek
such information on its own. The NLRB's Division of Economic Re-
search was the victim of political pressures and maneuverings, "pride of
Profession," empire building, personal attacks, and a mighty hostility
114 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411
(D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
115 Shultz, Priorities In Policy and Research for Industrial Relations, in INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS REEARCu ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TwENTY-Fnlsr ANNUAL WINTER
MEErING 12 (G. Somers ed. 1969).
116 But see Drotning & Lipsky, The Effectiveness of Reinstatement as a Public Policy
Remedy: The Kohler Case, 22 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 179 (1969).
117 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
118 Address by William Felderman, A.B.A. Labor Law Section Annual Meeting, Aug.
11, 1969, in BNA-DLR 157: F-i, 3 (Aug. 14, 1969).
119 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 135-56 (1968).
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to the administrative process. Through it all, ironically, little attention
was given to the substance of the Division's work or its importance to
the NLRB. Although each of the causes of the Economic Division's
demise would still have to be reckoned with today, it is reasonable to
conclude that the part of section 4(a) of the LMRA that prohibits the
Board from engaging in economic analysis is a historical anachronism.
